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Abstract
The ability to determine the accuracy of eyewitnesses has been explored by many researchers.
During the exploration, they examined the correlation between the eyewitness’s confidence and
the accuracy of the identification. Wixted and Wells (2017) determined that the strongest
confidence-accuracy correlation occurred immediately after identifying a suspect. However, are
there other times that a “strong” correlation occurs? At least 120 participants ( 𝑛 ≥ 120) were
assigned into one of three condition groups: post-identification only, pre-crime/postidentification, and pre/post-identification. Depending on the condition group, participants
provided confidence assessments in their ability to identify the correct culprit at different times
during the experiment. Based on past research, participants' confidence assessments made before
viewing the crime will have a negative correlation with the accuracy of a subsequent
identification of the staged crime.
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Introduction
In 1909, Hugo Münsterberg’s book, On the Witness Stand: Essays on Psychology and
Crime, questioned the accuracy of eyewitnesses. His book was broken into different sections
covering potential errors in human memory. In the section “Illusion”, Münsterberg demonstrates
how different witnesses can contradict each other when describing the same event despite both
parties proclaiming to be telling the truth (i.e., seeing a man with his dog versus a woman with
her child). In the section “The Memory of the Witness”, he discusses that people’s memories are
malleable. Memory malleability occurs when people fill their gaps of knowledge, especially
small details, with what is most common to them. Ultimately, Münsterberg argued that the
current justice system is subject to human error. His solution was to involve experimental
psychology to determine the accuracy of an eyewitness’s testimony. Following Münsterberg’s
call to action, other scholars examined how to determine the accuracy of eyewitnesses. In
particular, during the 1970s and 1980s, researchers explored the correlation between the
confidence of the eyewitnesses’ identification and the accuracy of the identification but to this
day have not fully explored the extent of this relationship.
As researchers investigated eyewitness testimonies, they discovered that certain practices
caused eyewitnesses to be overconfident in their identification regardless of their accuracy. This
included suspects standing out from the fillers during a police line-up. Fillers are known innocent
people that are in the lineup alongside the suspect. Another example of faulty practice is police
officers administering a lineup that influences the witness’s confidence because they were
provided with feedback about whether their identification matched the alleged perpetrator.
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As of 2016, 375 people have been released from prison due to new DNA evidence
suggesting that they were innocent of the crimes they allegedly committed. According to the
Innocence Project (2020), of these 375 mistaken decisions, 69% of them involved eyewitness
misidentifications. Despite not identifying the right person, eyewitnesses testified with higher
confidence due to the mistaken practices that increased their confidence. When witnesses testify,
jurors, in particular, are susceptible to the level of confidence the witness presents in their
identification. Douglass et. al (2010) evaluated the effect of a witness's confidence on a sample
of mock jurors. These participants were selected to be eyewitnesses of a crime. The witnesses
watched a video of a crime and were asked to identify the culprit. Subsequently, the officer
conducting the lineup provided one of three different post-identification pieces of information:
no feedback on their identification, disconfirming feedback on their identification, or confirming
feedback on their identification. Post-identification feedback involved the eyewitness selecting a
person from a police lineup, and then the lineup administrating officer would make one of
several statements regarding their answer. After hearing the feedback, the witness would offer
their testimony. A separate group of participants played the role of jurors. They evaluated the
witness's testimony based on what the eyewitness said and inferences the jurors derived from the
witness’s testimony. The jurors reported witnesses who received confirmatory feedback about
their identification as having a better viewing point and a better view of the crime compared to a
witness that received no response even though there was no difference in these attributes
between conditions. In addition, jurors that receive testimony based upon confirmatory feedback
testimony evaluated the witness as more accurate in their recollection of the crime. Overall, the
higher confidence eyewitnesses were viewed as more believable witnesses to jurors and their
testimony was weighted more heavily. This demonstrates the impact misplaced confidence can
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have on the verdicts, and may partially explain the number of DNA exonerations in cases due to
eyewitness misidentifications. Jurors simply placed too much weight on witness identification,
and in particular, those of highly confident witnesses that may not be accurate.
Although some psychologists continue to hold the belief that there is a significant
correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy, research is less supportive. Early
research demonstrated a weak relationship between the confidence of the eyewitness and their
accuracy. For example, 4 decades ago, Wells and Murray (1984) argued that even under the most
pristine conditions there was at best a weak correlation. To test this hypothesis, the researchers
staged a robbery. The people that witnessed the theft were eyewitnesses to the crime. Wells and
Murray (1984) had the eyewitnesses indicate their confidence before making an identification
(pre-identification), after making an identification (post-identification), and then asked if they
were willing to go to the police station and sign a statement swearing what they reported was
true. They evaluated people’s confidence using an 11-point Likert Scale. The strongest
correlation between confidence and accuracy was post-identification. This was 0.40,
demonstrating a small effect, with 16% of the variance in accuracy being determined by
confidence. However, Wells and Murray (1984) concluded that the sole use of confidence
post-identification was not a strong indicator of accuracy, and another form of verification should
be used for reliability.
Other scholars have suggested the correlation between confidence and accuracy is
moderately strong. Witnesses demonstrated a moderately strong correlation if identifying a
“present” suspect, a “present” suspect occurs when the suspect is in the current lineup for the
witness to select. Eyewitnesses have been revealed to be overconfident with their abilities to
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identify the correct witness in the best conditions (Sauer et. al, 2010; Juslin et. al, 1996). Sauer
et. al (2010) used participants who were approached by a confederate. After agreeing to
participate, another confederate, confederate B, would approach the participant for 10 seconds.
After time passed, confederate B would walk away. Participants were selected into one of two
groups: immediate identification or delayed identification. In the immediate identification
condition, after confederate B left, the participant would be given a lineup of 8 photos that may
or may not contain confederate B. Subsequently, participants were asked to identify the person
they saw. For the delayed identification condition, an email was sent 18-21 days after the
meeting with a link to an online identical lineup to the immediate condition. They were told the
lineup may or may not contain confederate B. Finally, the participants were asked to identify
confederate B. In both groups, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their
identification immediately afterward. The study demonstrated a significant correlation between
confidence and accuracy. Furthermore, high confidence led to a higher number of correct
identifications. However, the percentage was not equivalent to how accurate the participants
evaluated themselves. High confidence participants evaluated themselves as “90-100 percent”
confident in their identification. If accurate, it would follow that the high confidence participants
would have an accuracy of 90 percent or higher. However, this group correctly identified the
suspect 83.3 percent of the time. For the delayed condition, high confidence participants were
only accurate 79.2 percent of the time. For every level of confidence, the confidence-accuracy
correlation was not significantly different between immediate condition and delayed condition.
However, the correlation is weaker for the delayed condition than the immediate condition.
While the strength of the correlation between accuracy and confidence was significant, it
demonstrated that witnesses were still overconfident in their identifications.
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Unfortunately, in real life, confidence statements are not taken in the pristine conditions
that occur in most laboratory studies. Post-feedback confirmation of the identification and other
forms of post-identification misinformation lead to a lower correlation between confidence and
accuracy for eyewitness identifications. People can also have their confidence influenced by
pre-identification conditions as well. People determine how accurate a memory is based on
intrinsic cues, extrinsic cues, and self-credibility cues (Leippe et. al, 2009). Intrinsic cues are
how vivid the memory in question is. Extrinsic cues are the factors that could influence the
accuracy of the memory (i.e., distance between the witness and culprit, the lighting, etc.).
Self-credibility cues are the beliefs that a person has in their own abilities. Of the three,
self-credibility cues can negatively influence the accuracy of an identification the most. If a
person is irrationally confident in their ability, an eyewitness can provide an overconfident,
inaccurate suspect identification. There are multiple ways to influence a person’s self-credibility
cues. For example, participants could be given questions starting easy and increasing in difficulty
(Michael & Garry, 2019). These influences could be as dangerous as delayed confidence
evaluations based upon post-identification feedback.
Using self-credibility cue manipulation, Michael and Garry (2019) explored the effects of
question order on the eyewitness confidence-accuracy correlation. The researchers had
participants watch a video of a crime being committed. Participants were assigned to one of two
groups. Group 1 had their subsequent questions ordered from most difficult to easiest. Group 2
had their questions ordered from easiest to most difficult. There were 30 questions in total. After
each question, both groups were asked to rate how confident they were in their answer. After
completing the exam, the participants were asked to guess how many of the 30 questions they
answered correctly. Both groups performed similarly on the test. However, Group 1 believed
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they answered more questions correctly than Group 2. The researchers hypothesized that the
first question caused an anchoring effect. Anchoring is a mental bias that causes people to use the
first piece of information they receive as an anchor. All subsequent evaluations are adjusted with
respect to the anchoring point. So, as a result, those receiving easier questions become more
confident in their identifications because they were more confident in their initial responses (i.e.,
the initial responses were the anchor). On the other hand, both groups reported similar levels of
confidence in their memory of the crime. In this experiment, the participants’ confidence anchor
was associated with only the manner: the difficulty of the questions asked. This could explain the
disconnect between “answer” confidence and “memory” confidence. Since in real life a test
would not be administered, if questioning started easy and increased in difficulty about the
crime, the eyewitness would anchor their memory confidence of the crime with the easy
questions. Thus, consistent with research, the eyewitness’s confidence level would inflate during
the suspect identification without adding any accuracy.
Another form of manipulating self-credibility cues is pre-identification feedback.
Pre-identification feedback also boosts the confidence of an eyewitness without increasing any
accuracy. Iida and Mah (2020) examined how participants would react when given the results of
a “fake” assessment. The assessment claimed to determine how accurate an eyewitness
testimony of the participant would likely be. After taking the assessment, they watched a video
of a crime. Before they were given a test regarding the crime, the participants were assigned one
of three types of feedback on their “fake” assessments: good score, bad score, and no feedback.
These evaluations were not related to actual performance. The participants then completed a
questionnaire composed of normal questions and leading questions, questions that mislead
participants with false information, regarding the mock crime. For both leading and normal
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questions, participants that received a “good score” through feedback, reported more confidence
in their answers; however, they did not show improved accuracy in their answers. This suggests
that such feedback negatively inflates the confidence of the eyewitness. Thus, the type of “fake”
positive feedback reduces the favorable correlation between accuracy and confidence.
If the confidence assessment does not occur immediately after the identification,
misinformation can cause overconfident evaluations in between the identification and confidence
assessment (Douglass & Neuschatz, 2010). However, misinformation can also come before the
identification and cause people to report a subsequent identification with higher confidence
(Spearing & Wade, 2021; Iida et. al, 2020; Flowe et al., 2018). Flowe et al. (2018) had women
participate in a 2 (the alcohol content of their drink) x 2 (the participant’s perception of their
drink) study. The first independent variable was whether the women were drinking alcohol or
tonic water. The second independent variable was whether they were told if they were drinking
alcohol or tonic water. After drinking their assigned beverages, the participants went through a
party simulation. During the party, the women talked to a confederate male, and the participants
were able to continue the conversation with the man as far as they desired. Seven days after
participating in the simulation, the women returned and were given 18 pieces of information
regarding their experience. Each piece of information could be presented as a statement, and the
statement could be either consistent, neutral, or inconsistent. Consistent statements were true
pieces of information (i.e., the man was 25 years old). Neutral statements were broad truthful
statements (i.e., the man was in his twenties). Finally, inconsistent statements would be false
statements regarding the situation (i.e., the man was 21). Of the 18 statements, 6 were consistent
statements, 6 were neutral statements, and 6 statements were inconsistent. The type of
statements’ order was randomized. Then, the women attempted to recall what happened during
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the simulation. Finally, they were asked one statement-related question per statement provided.
After each question, the participants reported how confident they were in their answer. Results
across all conditions showed that participants reported inconsistent statements with higher
confidence than other types of statements. This demonstrates that misinformation introduced at
any stage of the process can boost confidence in inaccurate information, causing a drop in the
confidence-accuracy correlation.
Wixted and Wells (2017) argue that an eyewitness's confidence can predict the accuracy
of their accusation, but it depends on when the confidence is obtained and under what conditions.
The most important consideration is when the witness is asked how confident they are.
Confidence statements must be taken directly after the identification for higher accuracy to
occur. An eyewitness often provides a less accurate confidence statement during a trial. The main
reason for the flawed confidence evaluation is the time in between the identification and the
confidence statement allows for outside or internal influences. To affect the witnesses’ belief
about confidence, one outside influence could be post-identification feedback (Sauer et. al 2010).
An internal influence could be rehearsing faulty information multiple times, increasing
confidence without increasing accuracy (Spearing & Wade, 2021). If the confidence statement is
taken immediately, the witness only has their selection as their means to determine their
confidence. Wixted and Wells found immediate confidence evaluations demonstrate a higher
correlation between proclaimed confidence and identification accuracy than other times during
the process. Namely, people with “high” confidence identify the correct suspect more often than
the witnesses with low confidence. Wixted and Wells further determined the best conditions
under which eyewitness identifications have the highest confidence-accuracy correlation.
Accordingly, there are five conditions that must be met. One, the confidence assessment must be
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taken immediately after the identification is made. Two, if there are multiple suspects, only one
suspect should be in a lineup at a time. For example, if there are two suspects, there must be at
least two prepared lineups with a different suspect in each. Three, the suspect should not stand
out from the other fillers that surround them. To avoid the suspect from standing out, the officer
should have the eyewitness describe the suspect’s appearance. When selecting the lineups, the
fillers should match the description provided. In addition, everyone in the lineup should be
wearing the same clothing. If the suspect stands out from the fillers, the eyewitness could
confidently identify the suspect without seeing the crime, because the “suspect” is more salient
for irrelevant reasons. Four, the eyewitness should be informed that the suspect may or may not
be present in the line-up. Eyewitnesses come to lineups determined to identify who committed
the crime. This leads them to be reluctant to say the culprit is not in the lineup. Informing the
eyewitness that the culprit may or may not be in the lineup, allows them to know that the correct
answer may be none of the lineup is the culprit. Finally, the person who is administering the
eyewitness identification should not know who the suspects or fillers are. If the person
administering the lineup is aware of the suspect, they could consciously or subconsciously
influence the eyewitness’s identification. Having a double-blind lineup prevents this influence
from occurring. These “pristine” conditions allow for the highest correlation between confidence
and accuracy. The relationship and strength of the correlation extend to when the eyewitness’s
viewing conditions are not ideal (i.e., poor lighting, the presence of a weapon, etc.).With the
pristine conditions in place, witnesses will intuitively adjust their confidence depending on their
familiarity of factors that are influencing their ability to view the crime and the perpetrator
properly.
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As Wixted and Wells (2017) determined, the timing of the confidence statement is crucial
for its strongest correlation with accuracy. The best practice to avoid misinformation with “high”
confidence is to record the confidence statement immediately after the initial identification. By
extension, this should be true for witnesses providing details about the crime. Spearing and Wade
(2021) explored what “immediately” means when eyewitnesses report their confidence on
multiple pieces of information from a crime. In their research, the definition of “immediately”
had two possibilities: after each detail or after all the details. For their experiment, the
researchers had people watch a recording of a crime and asked them to memorize as many details
of the crime as possible. Before receiving a test, participants were unknowingly randomly
assigned to one of two groups. The two groups differed when they would report their level of
confidence for each response. For Group 1, participants were reminded after each of their
answers to report their level of confidence. In contrast, Group 2 completed both sections of the
evaluation before the examiners informed them to report the level of confidence they had in each
individual response. The test was split into two different sections. The first section was a free
response. Participants were asked to provide as many details as they could remember. While
participants could make broader statements (i.e., the person looked to be in their mid-twenties),
they were also asked to refrain from guessing any information. After each written detail, Group 1
was told to provide how confident they were in each detail. In the second section, both groups
were provided a cued-recall test. After each question, Group 1 was reminded to provide a
confidence statement. After the cued-recall test was completed, Group 2 was informed to provide
a confidence statement for each individual detail they provided in the free-response and for each
question on the cued-recall test. The researchers discovered that both groups’
confidence-accuracy correlations were similar. Originally, the researchers hypothesized that
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Group 2 would have a weaker correlation than Group 1. Based on past research, delaying a
confidence evaluation inflates the person’s confidence since they are exposed to the information
for longer. This is because a longer delay allows the witness to evaluate their memories multiple
times. If a person thinks about an event more times, they become more familiar with the
information. Increasing their familiarity increases their confidence without also increasing their
accuracy. Therefore, a longer delay leads to an overconfident evaluation. Despite past evidence,
There are two possibilities for the similar relationship in this study. One, there was limited time
in between answering the questions and reporting confidence. This inhibited rehearsing the
information and misinformation interfering with the eyewitness’s memory. Two, participants
used their common sense to accurately adjust. Koriatz’s (1997) cue-utilization theory states that
people will use their beliefs or cues to determine how confident they are in a task. For example,
if a person is not good with faces, they will rate their confidence lower on a face identification
task regardless of when they provide their confidence. Therefore, for Group 2, the participants
knew their strengths and weaknesses, and they subsequently adjusted accordingly. Ultimately,
while “immediate” does not necessarily mean directly after each item, it reinforces the concept
that for a higher eyewitness confidence to accuracy correlation witnesses need the confident
statement to be taken before other factors influence their evaluation of confidence.
To further demonstrate the strength of the correlation between accuracy and confidence,
Wixted, Read, and Lindsay (2016) analyzed how the correlation was calculated. The old method
of calculating used a calibration plot. First, identifications were grouped by the eyewitness’s
stated confidence. For example, The levels of confidence could be 0-40% confident as “low”
confidence, 41-80% confident as “medium” confidence, and 81-100% confident as “high”
confidence. Second, for each level of confidence they would record the number of subject
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identifications in a target present lineup, number of subject identifications in a target absent
lineup, number of filler identifications in a target present lineup, and the number of filler
identifications in a target absent lineup. Target refers to the person the police are looking for, so a
target present lineup has the culprit, and a target absent lineup does not contain the suspect that
committed the crime. A suspect identification in a target present (STP) lineup occurs when the
eyewitness correctly identifies the suspect in a lineup. A suspect identification in a target absent
(STA) lineup occurs when the eyewitness identifies a designated innocent suspect. Filler
identifications (FTP and FTA) are when the eyewitness selects a person the police know did not
commit the crime, and who were placed in the lineup because they look similar to the suspect.
After collecting all the data, researchers created an equation to determine accuracy. The equation
is the number of STP (n_1STP) divided by the sum of n_1STP, number of STA (n_2STA),
number of FTA (n_3FTA), and number of FTP (n_4FTP). In equation form, n_1STP/(n_1STP +
n_2STA + n_3FTA + n_4FTP) = p, where p is the percentage of correct answers. The issue with
this equation is the denominator. This equation reduces the strength of suspect identifications
with filler identification information. Knowing how often a person makes a filler identification
with certain confidence levels is important; however, the police know these identification are
incorrect.
Yet, a more problematic issue occurs in eyewitnesses identifying the wrong suspect when
it is not clear that they are the wrong suspect, leading to a wrongful conviction. If the police
know the filler could not have committed the crime then this information is not important and
only reduces the correlation between confidence and accuracy. Therefore, the researchers elected
to focus only on suspect identifications. The new equation is n_1STP/(n_1STP +n_3FTA/N) = p.
“p” is the percentage of correct suspect identifications, and N is the number of people in the
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lineup. For example, if the number of people in the lineup is 6, n_3FTA/6. Using this new
equation, Wixted, Reed, and Lindsey (2016) using this formula demonstrated that previous delay
identification research had a stronger confidence-accuracy correlation. For instance, Sauer et. al
(2010) found that “high” confidence identification in the immediate group was 83.3% correct,
and the delayed group was 79.2% correct. Using the new equation, with “high” confidence
identifications, the researchers found the immediate group was 97.6% accurate and the delayed
group was 96.8% accurate. This results in a stronger correlation between accuracy and
confidence.
Using the pristine conditions detailed by Wixted and Wells (2017), the
confidence-accuracy correlation exists outside of the laboratory and in real life. From January
22, 2013, to December 5, 2013, 45 police investigators from the Houston Police Department took
part in an experiment (Wixted et. al, 2016). The investigators performed witness lineups with one
of four conditions: blind sequential, blind simultaneous, blinded sequential, blinded
simultaneous. Each condition had eyewitnesses examine a 6 photo lineup. For the sequential
conditions, the witness would see each photo individually. For the simultaneous conditions, all
six photos would be presented at the same time. For the blinded conditions, the investigator
conducting the lineup would not be informed of the suspects and fillers. After an eyewitness
made a suspect-identification or filler-identification, they were asked to rate their confidence on
a three-point scale. The results showed that there was a strong correlation between confidence
and accuracy. A strong correlation was more prevalent when the investigator was in the blinded
condition. This demonstrates the conditions established by Wixted and Wells (2017) are
necessary for the confidence-accuracy correlation to be maximized in a real-world application.
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Throughout the history of eyewitness testimonies, the correlation between confidence and
accuracy has been questioned. In the beginning, researchers believed that there was a weak
relationship. However, under the “pristine” conditions established by Wixted and Wells (2017),
research has shown a strong correlation between immediate confidence assessments and
accuracy (Wixted et. al, 2016) and extended this to the real-world (Wixted et. al, 2016). The
existence of a strong correlation at one time of the eyewitness process raises the possibilities of
there being other times in the process when eyewitness’s confidence more validly predicts
accuracy. Since confidence statements are unreliable when not taken immediately after the
identification (Sauer et. al, 2010; Innocence Project, 2020), perhaps there are times before the
identification that yield higher confidence-accuracy correlations. For example, can eyewitnesses
determine if they can identify the correct suspect before seeing the lineup? Taking it a step
further, could a person determine if they were an accurate eyewitness before they witnessed a
crime?
Past researchers have examined if the confidence-accuracy correlation occurs earlier than
immediately after identification. Whittington et. al (2019) performed two experiments to test the
confidence-accuracy correlation before the eyewitness even saw a lineup. In the first experiment,
participants were shown a series of photos containing houses and faces for a face encoding task.
The background of the photo was green for every non-target photo, and the background was red
when the target’s face was displayed. The green background images were shown for 0.5 seconds.
The red background photo was shown for 1 second. Then, the researchers displayed a fair lineup.
The participants were informed that the target may or may not be in the lineup. Finally, the
participants identified which face had a red background. Participants repeated this process six
times in total. Three of the six lineups were target present. The other three were target absent
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lineups. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three condition groups: pre-identification,
post-identification, and pre/post-identification. In all conditions, participants provided a
confidence assessment ranging from 0-10. The pre-identification condition had participants
indicate how confident they were after the face encoding task and before the lineup was
presented. The post-identification group provided their level of confidence after identifying who
they believed was the culprit. Finally, the pre/post-identification condition offered confidence
scores at both times. In a second experiment, participants were shown a video of a man stealing a
woman’s phone from her car. In the minute-long video, the man’s face was visible for nine
seconds total and directly faced the camera for 2 seconds. Participants were assigned to one of
two condition groups: pre/post-identification and post-identification. In the
pre/post-identification condition, during the pre-identification assessment, participants were
asked how confident they were, ranging from 0-100%, in their ability to identify the culprit in a
future lineup. Next, both groups performed a 30 question common-sense distractor task. Then,
the participants were shown a lineup that they were informed may or may not contain the culprit.
The lineup had an equal chance of being target present or target absent. After making an
identification, the eyewitnesses provided a confidence rating from 0-100%. Over both
experiments, the post-identification assessments had a strong confidence-accuracy correlation.
On the other hand, the pre-identification assessments were poorly correlated with confidence and
accuracy. Furthermore, whenever a participant made both a pre/post-identification, they had a
weaker confidence-accuracy post-identification correlation than the only post-identification
condition. One possible reason for this could be participants anchoring their post-identification
confidence assessments based on the pre-identification assessment. This could demonstrate that
confidence is only useful immediately after the identification.
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If people are able to predict if they are a good eyewitness, there may exist a type of
super-eyewitness. These super-witnesses possess certain skills that allow them to be superior to
other eyewitnesses. Grabman et al. (2019) examined whether so-called “super-recognizers”
would be better eyewitnesses. For clarification. super-recognizers are people with the ability to
recognize faces more accurately. In the beginning, participants were informed of three pieces of
information. One, they would see a series of faces. Two, each face would appear three times.
Three, they would be asked to recall these faces either after a five-minute delay or a day delay,
depending on what condition group they were in. During the experiment, participants saw twelve
different faces: six black and six white. Each face was displayed for three seconds with a
one-second delay in between. The order of the pictures was randomized, and the same face never
appeared consecutively. Finally, faces of the same race did not appear more than two times
consecutively. To prevent primacy bias, the ability to remember the first piece of information
better than subsequent information (“Primacy effect - biases & heuristics”, 2021), and recency
bias, the information presented last is remembered better than the prior information (Vallar,
2015), two different filler faces were shown at the start and end of the sequence.
After the participant’s assigned delay, they were asked to identify the familiar face from
the lineup. Also, the researchers informed the participants that the lineup may or may not contain
a familiar face. There were twelve total lineups: 6 target present and 6 target absent. For the
presentation of the lineups, only 2 consecutive target absent or target present were allowed to
appear in a row. The same rule applied for the race of the lineup. Finally, the suspect was always
in a different serial position from the previous lineup. After each selection, the participants were
asked to fill out three evaluations. One, they typed in a textbox how certain they were in their
identification. Two, the participants provided an expression of certainty by providing a detail that
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made the face a familiar face. Three, they indicated how confident they were in their
identification with a six-point scale, starting with 0% and increasing by 20% increments to 100%
confidence. Once the participants were shown all twelve lineups, they took the Cambridge Face
Memory Test. This test showed participants a face to memorize. Then, they were shown three
photos of faces and asked to identify which was the original face. Overall, the researchers found
a strong correlation between confidence and accuracy for the immediate condition and delay
condition assessments. However, participants with “poor” and “average” face recognition
abilities were more vulnerable to making high confidence misidentifications. The reasoning
behind the increased errors was how detailed these participants recorded a target’s face. Since
their representations were less robust, higher confidence does not correlate with the same level of
accuracy as a strong face-recognizer. Furthermore, strong face-recognizers were more likely to
reject target absent lineups. One issue is the participants would not know whether they are super
recognizers without being informed. So, despite being a “strong” face-recognizer, participants
are not able to adjust their confidence based on this fact. In conclusion, strong face-recognizers
appear to have the ability to be better eyewitnesses than other people.
Gettleman et. al (2021) further examined the abilities of super-recognizer compared to
controls. The researchers informed the participants to memorize the presented faces. The
participants were shown a total of twelve faces. Participants were told some of the faces would
appear once, and others would appear four times. Each face was individually displayed for 3
seconds with a 1-second break in between. In the experiment, six of the faces were shown only
one time. This caused the participants to have a weak encoding of these faces. The other six
faces were shown four times throughout the sequence. This provided participants with a strong
encoding of these faces. For the faces shown four times, the participants saw the same face twice
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in the first half of the sequence and twice in the second half. However, the same face was never
shown consecutively. Finally, to avoid potential recency and primacy biases, participants were
shown two filler faces at the start and two different filler faces at the end. After seeing the entire
sequence, participants were shown twelve different photo lineups. Each fair lineup contained 6
people wearing maroon shirts. Six of the lineup were target present, and six were target absent.
Participants were asked to identify amongst the lineup which face was shown in the
sequence, or if none of the faces were familiar in the lineup, they would say no one matched a
face shown. After making an identification, the participants were asked to indicate their level of
confidence. After the lineups, they took the Cambridge Face Memory Test. While all levels of
face recognition abilities produced a strong correlation between confidence and accuracy, strong
face-recognizers had a stronger confidence-accuracy correlation compared to medium and weak
face-recognizers. Furthermore, participants with lower face recognition abilities were more likely
to make high confidence misidentifications. However, if a certain lineup’s accuracy was low,
both strong and weak groups had a lower accuracy percentage. On the other hand, if the
participant’s accuracy with a certain lineup was high, the correlation between accuracy and
confidence was higher. The crucial point is that participants with strong face recognition abilities
were less likely to make high confidence errors (26 false identifications compared to 192 false
identifications for weak face-recognizers). They were able to use the confidence scale more
validly. Thus, police officers appear to be able to trust the confidence assessment of a strong
face-recognizer eyewitness as compared to the average witness. This demonstrates that the
ability to encode more detailed memories of faces is a valuable skill for an eyewitness.
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A primary reason eyewitnesses have a weak confidence-accuracy correlation is
misinformation inflating their confidence. If the officer conducting a lineup provides positive
post-identification feedback about their identification, the eyewitness’s confidence would
increase without increasing accuracy (Sauer et. al, 2010). The misinformation is the feedback
provided. If the eyewitness has their self-credibility cues increased before the identification, they
will provide overconfident assessment statements as well (Iida et. al, 2020; Micheal & Garry,
2019). The boost to the eyewitness’s self-credibility cue is the misinformation. If outside
information the eyewitness receives is the issue, eyewitnesses may become better predictors of
their abilities without information. As Koriatz (1997) suggests with cue-utilization theory, people
may know what they are skilled in and what skills they lack. This allows people to alter their
level of confidence. As Grabman et. al (2021) demonstrated, there are skills (face recognition
abilities) that make some eyewitnesses more reliable than others. Therefore, combining the two
areas of research, people should be able to determine how accurate of an eyewitness they are
based on their knowledge of themselves.
Kruger and Dunning (1999) performed four experiments about people’s ability to
evaluate their abilities. For Experiment 1, they had people rank humor based on what others
would find humorous. Experiment 2 had participants perform logical reasoning based on
situations crafted from the LSAT’s guidelines. For Experiment 3, participants performed a
grammar task. Also, they were shown high percentile performances (people who performed well
on the exam) versus low percentile performances (people who performed poorly). Then, the
participants were asked to determine how their performances were scored, testing the
metacognition abilities of the participants. Metacognition is the ability to use prior knowledge to
evaluate responses and determine the results (“Teal center fact sheet no. 4: Metacognitive
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processes”, 2019). Experiment 4 had participants use logical reasoning to solve a problem. Then,
the researchers explained how to correctly solve the logical reasoning task.
For all the tasks, Kruger and Dunning had participants perform skills that required
knowledge or innate abilities for good performance. For each experiment, the participants would
evaluate how well they thought they did after they completed the task. Overall, participants’
average evaluation of their abilities was in the 66th percentile. The group overestimated their
abilities compared to the 50th percentile average. Furthermore, participants in the bottom quartile
evaluated their performance higher than the standard average as well. In Experiment 3, the lower
quartile also displayed a lower level of metacognition. Therefore, if the participant is ignorant
about a certain topic, they are more likely to be overconfident, so, if logical reasoning abilities
and metacognitions associated with them work similar to eyewitness ones. Then, in terms of
being an eyewitness, this could lead participants to be overconfident in their abilities to be good
eyewitnesses when they are in fact and especially poor eyewitnesses.
Present Research
For the present research, in regards to the confidence-accuracy correlation of a participant
before seeing a crime, an eyewitness’s preconception of their abilities negatively correlates with
the accuracy of their recount of the crime. More accurate eyewitnesses possess prior knowledge
or certain innate abilities that allow them to remember the culprit more accurately. Grabman et
al. (2019) demonstrated that those include superior face recognition abilities. Kruger and
Dunning (1999) revealed on average people tend to overestimate their abilities that require prior
knowledge or innate skills. Furthermore, people that are ignorant of a skill will severely
overestimate their abilities. Since identifying a culprit is a new task for most people, participants

23
will perform similarly to people in the lower quartile of other skills. Therefore, most participants
will provide overconfident statements and produce a negative confidence-accuracy correlation.
Next, if a participant makes their confidence assessment before making an identification, there
will be no correlation or a weak correlation between confidence and accuracy. Whittington et. al
(2019) showed that providing a pre-identification assessment lowers the strength of the
confidence-accuracy correlation. Therefore, a confidence assessment before witnessing a crime
or before seeing the lineup will weaken the correlation between the post-identification
confidence and accuracy.

Hypotheses
1. Confidence assessments made before viewing the crime will have a negative correlation
with the accuracy of a subsequent identification of a staged crime
2. The confidence-accuracy correlation for the assessments performed before seeing the
lineup will be weakest when compared to the ones that occur immediately after making
an identification
3. For conditions where participants are provided a confidence assessment before the
post-identification confidence-accuracy correlation, the post-identification correlation
will be weaker than the post-identification only condition group because their second
assessment will be anchored by the first level of confidence the participant provided.
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Methods

Participants
Participants will be gathered from Turkprime to interface with Amazon Mechanical Turk
in exchange for a payment of 10 dollars (Gettleman et. al, 2019). Participants will provide
informed consent consistent with the APA Principle. If the participants fail the attention check or
do not complete the study, they will not receive their payment. The number of participant
responses will be at least 240, determined by G*Power 3.1.9.7 and accounting for potential
participants that fail the attention checks (Faul et. al, 2009). This provides a sufficient number for
a test with a weak effect size (𝑑 = 0. 3), 0.05 error probability (α = 0. 05), 0.8 power (
β = 0. 8), and three conditions: post-identification only, pre-crime/ post-identification, and
pre/post-identification (𝑑𝑓 = 2). Finally, multiply everything by two since there are two
potential lineups: target present and target absent, but these are not going to be cross-examined,
so two separate three conditions being compared.

Materials

Mock Crime Video
The video will be a first-person point of view using a shoulder-mounted camera elevated
at a height of 5’ 7’’. This height is based upon the average height of a person in the United
States, being roughly 5’7”. The video will be shot in good lighting during the middle of the day
25 feet from the crime. Past research has demonstrated that participants are able to accurately
adjust their level of confidence based on the distance they witnessed the crime and the lighting of
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the crime scene (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Therefore, neither of these factors should influence the
abilities of participants to make “high” confidence misidentification.
The crime the participants will be viewing is a woman having her bag stolen by a white
man with short and brown hair, a clean shave, and in his early 20s. In the sight of the eyewitness,
the man will sneak up behind the woman and attempt to snatch her bag. The women will struggle
for a bit and cry for help. After the woman’s bag is stolen, the witness will see the man run away.
The video will end when the camera approaches the woman, checking to see if she is okay. The
robber will not be carrying any weapons that will distract the participants (Carlson et. al, 2017).
If a weapon is present, participants will focus on the weapon and less on the face of the
perpetrator. This will cause less correct identifications and more filler identification. The video
will be one minute long. 30 seconds of the video will contain the crime. Of the 30 seconds, the
culprit’s face will be visible in the shot for 9 seconds. Finally, the person committing the crime
will look directly at the camera for 2 seconds (Whittington et. al, 2019).

Identification
The lineup will consist of six, 2 x 3-inch photos presented simultaneously on one screen.
The photos will be organized three to a row. The positions will be randomized for each
participant. Participants will be instructed that the target may or may not be present in the lineup
(Wixted & Wells, 2017). Target absent and target present lineups will be the same probability of
appearing. Wells et.al (2020) provides further recommendations for how to select fillers for a
police lineup. For match-to-description, fillers will be white men with short, brown-haired,
clean-shaven, and in their early 20s. In addition, the suspect will not stand out based on
background or clothing. So, all the men will have blank expressions and wear maroon shirts with
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a plain white background (Gettleman et. al, 2021). During “mock witness” testing from
randomly generated lineups, the culprit was only identified 17.6% of the time, roughly chance
levels. This suggests the culprit is part of a fair lineup. Therefore, he should not be confidently
identified without witnessing the crime.

Confidence rating scale
Using a scale similar to Whittington et. al (2019), the confidence rating scale will be a
continuous scale, ranging from 0-100% confident (see Fig. 1). 0% means the participant has no
confidence who the culprit is and guessed. 100% confidence means the participant believes
without a doubt the person they identified was the culprit. “High” confidence for participants
will be 81-100% confidence. “Medium” confidence will be 61-80% confidence. “Low”
confidence will be 0-60% confidence.

Figure 1 Example of the confidence rating scale, ranging from 0-100. The question is for the
Time 3 confidence assessment. The participant is evaluating themself as 77 percent confident.
Instructions for what 0 and 100 represent with each scale.
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Face Recognition Task
Participants will complete the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT) to judge their face
recognition abilities (Grabman et. al, 2019; Grabman et. al, 2021). In the task, participants will
be shown six faces in three orientations to memorize. Then, the participants will select between
three faces: one target and two fillers. The participants will identify 72 faces for three
increasingly difficult blocks, and the sum of the correctly identified faces, ranging 0-72, will
predict the performance of a respondent.

Procedures
The participants will be provided a consent form and informed of the task they will be
administered. After consenting to the experiment, participants will be randomly assigned to one
of three condition groups: post-identification only, pre-crime/ post-identification, and
pre/post-identification. Each of these conditions will determine when the participant will provide
a confidence assessment (see Fig. 2). The post-identification condition will evaluate the
participant’s confidence after they have identified a person as the potential culprit (Time 3). For
the pre-crime/post-identification condition group, subjects will assess their confidence before
seeing the mock crime video (Time 1). Then, they will perform another assessment after the
identification, similar to the post-identification condition (Time 3). Finally, the
pre/post-identification condition will evaluate their confidence immediately after seeing the
mock crime video (Time 2). Additionally, like all other groups, they will provide another
confidence assessment after the identification (Time 3).
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Figure 2 Timeline for the experiment. Each confidence assessment only occurs if the participant
is in the appropriate condition group. If not, the participant moves to the next section of the
experiment.
Once assigned to a condition group, participants will either provide their confidence
assessment or immediately watch the mock crime video. For the pre-crime conditions,
participants will be asked about their confidence to perform multiple different skills not
pertaining to being an eyewitness. Within the series of questions, the researcher would ask “How
confident are you in your ability to identify the culprit in a crime you witnessed?” This skill
assessment serves as a way to prevent the pre-crime condition group from having an advantage
or being primed for an eyewitness identification task. If the participants were only asked about
their abilities to be an eyewitness, they would be aware that the study is requiring them to be
eyewitnesses. This is information the other condition groups would not have provided.
Before pressing play, the researcher will inform the participants to pay attention to the
video and the events that transpire. After watching the video, the participants would answer an
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attention check question. The attention check question is a multiple-choice question, “what was
the crime that was committed in the video?” If the participant failed to answer “robbery”, the
participant is provided a second multiple choice question. The question reads, “what color was
the culprit’s hair?” If they failed to answer “brown”, they will be removed from the experiment
and not paid for their participation. Then, the subjects in the pre-identification condition would
provide a confidence assessment. They will be asked, “How confident are you in your ability to
identify the culprit in a future lineup?” Next, all participants will work on a sudoku puzzle for 5
minutes as a distractor task (Grabman et. al, 2019). Once the five minutes are completed,
participants will be shown a lineup. The lineup will have an equal chance of being target present
or target absent. The participants are told “Here is a lineup. The person who committed the crime
may or may not be within this lineup. If the person is within the lineup, select the photo of the
person. If the person is not in the lineup, select the button at the bottom of the screen.” Stating
the target may or may not be in the lineup is a condition that creates the pristine conditions for
the confidence accuracy condition (Wixted and Wells, 2017). The participant will select one of
the available options. Afterward, they are asked, “How confident are you in your identification
or lack of identification?” Participants will use the confidence rating scale to indicate their level
of confidence. Next, they would complete the CFMT. Finally, they will provide some
demographic information (gender, race, and age), and the participants are debriefed.

Results/Prediction

Face Recognition Task
To determine the strength of the participants’ face recognition abilities, the total number
of correctly identified faces will be recorded for each participant. Then, the median will be
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determined from the collected data. Afterward, one median absolute deviation will be calculated.
Participants within the interval of the median plus and minus one median absolute deviation are
“average” face recognizers. “Strong” face recognizers are scores above the interval. “Poor” face
recognizers are scores below the interval.

Lineup decisions (Target Present and Target Absent)
Data will be collected to determine the response percentage for each condition for both
target present lineups and target absent lineups. For the target present lineups, the three possible
responses are Correct ID, Filler ID, or Rejection. Correct ID occurs when the participant
correctly identifies the culprit. Filler ID occurs when a participant incorrectly identifies a filler as
the culprit. Finally, Rejection occurs when the participant believes the culprit is not within the
lineup. For the target absent lineup, the two possible responses are Filler ID and Correct
Rejection. After collecting the number of each response, the information will be converted into
percentages (see Table 1). These percentages will then be compared using a Chi-squared test. For
example, the percentage of Correct IDs for a target present lineup will be compared for each
condition.

Based on Whittington et. al (2019), no responses will be significantly different from the
same response in different conditions. In other words, the percentage of Correct Rejections in a
target absent lineup will not be significantly different between pre-crime/post-identification,
pre/post-identification, and post-identification condition groups. This will be true for every
possible response. The main difference between the conditions should stem from confidence
assessments. The level of confidence is not a factor for this analysis, only the participants’ skills
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as an eyewitness. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition group, so the overall skill
of the group should be similar for each condition. Unless one condition randomly ends up with
more “super” identifiers. Therefore, the number of Correct IDs or Correct Rejections will be
higher than the other conditions. If the “super” recognizers are separated equally, no group
should produce a significantly different percentage on any response.

TP Lineup Decisions

TA Lineup Decisions

Confidence
Assessment

Correct ID
rate

Filler ID
rate

Rejection
rate

Filler ID
rate

Correct
Rejection
Rate

Pre-crime/PostIdentification

0.75 (30)

0.15 (6)

0.10 (4)

0.525 (21)

0.475 (19)

Pre/PostIdentification

0.725 (29)

0.125 (5)

0.15 (6)

0.35 (14)

0.65 (26)

Post-Identification

0.82 (33)

0.075 (3)

0.10 (4)

0.425 (17)

0.575 (23)

Table 1 Experiment identification and rejection rates for target present (TP) and target absent
(TA) lineups. The raw number of a given response is present in the parentheses (Table 1A).

ROC Analysis
ROC is plotting the proportion of Correct IDs in a target present lineup (the number of
correct identifications divided by the number of TP lineups presented) over the proportion of
Filler IDs in a target absent lineup (the number of filler identifications divided by 6, then divided
by the number of TA lineups presented) based on the confidence level. To get the points for the
curve, the first point will be the proportion of Correct IDs over the proportion of Filler IDs of
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participants that evaluated their level of confidence from 90-100%. The next point will be the
cumulative proportion of Correct IDs over the proportion of Filler IDs of participants that
evaluated their level of confidence at 80-100%. Each proceeding point will add the next 10
percent confidence interval to the previous cumulation, so the next point would be evaluating
70-100% (see Fig. 3). Then, each condition’s ROC will have its partial area underneath the curve
(pAUC) calculated. The pAUC indicates the overall accuracy of an eyewitness’s ability to
produce a Correct ID or select a filler when the target is absent. Finally, the pAUC of each
condition will be compared using the pROC (Robin et. al, 2011). There will be five total curves
to compare: post-identification only confidence assessment (Curve 1),
pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessment (Curve 2),
pre-crime/post-identification Time 3 confidence assessment (Curve 3), pre/post-identification
Time 2 confidence assessment (Curve 4), and pre/post-identification Time 3 confidence
assessment (Curve 5). Curve 4 and Curve 5 pull from the same participants since the information
comes from that condition. However, participants should evaluate their level of confidence
differently during the pre/post-identification Time 2 versus pre/post-identification Time 3.
Therefore, the two curves should look very different, so there are two curves. The same logic
applies to Curve 2 and Curve 3.
Using Whittington et. al (2019) as a point of reference, the pAUC for Curve 1, 3, 4, and 5
will all be similar and significantly different. However, Curve 2 will also be significantly
different. Curve 2 involves the pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessments.
Kruger and Dunning (1999) demonstrated that people overestimate their abilities. This would
lead to a greater number of high confidence misidentifications. Therefore, the proportion of
Correct IDs will be lower, and the proportion of Filler IDs would be higher. Since the ending
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value should be similar to the other curves, the lower start would cause a smaller area to be
calculated.

Figure 3 Mock receiver operating characteristic curves using the raw data (Table 1A)

CAC calibration, Calibration, and Resolution
Calibration determines whether the participants that evaluate their level of confidence at
80 percent is actually 80 percent accurate. The equations to perform the calculations are provided
in Brewer et. al (2002). Resolution is measured using ANDI, adjusted normalized discrimination
index. Resolution determines how well confidence levels discriminate between Correct IDs and
Filler IDs (see Yaniv et al., 1991, for the original formulas). The ANDI ranges from 0 to 1. 0
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means the level of confidence provided gives no discrimination. 1 means perfect discrimination
for confidence level.
For the calibration analyses, every condition's Time 3 confidence assessment will have a
lower value to show that they are close to perfect calibration. On the other hand,
pre/post-identification Time 2 confidence assessment will have a significantly higher value for
calibration (Whittington et. al 2019), and pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence
assessment calibration value will be significantly higher than all the other calibration values.
This is because the participants will overestimate their abilities. Calibration determines how
close the evaluated confidence percent is to the actual percent correct. If the participant is
overconfident, they drop the group’s correct percentage.
For resolution, the post-identification only confidence assessment will have the highest
value since it will provide the strongest correlation. Pre/post-identification and
pre-crime/post-identification Time 3 confidence assessments will discriminate less than the
post-identification only confidence assessment but will be similar in value. Finally,
pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 and pre/post-identification Time 2 confidence assessments
will have values lower than the post-identification scores. These values will be closer to 0 than 1.
Furthermore, the pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessment value will have the
smallest value of all assessments and discriminate less than the pre/post-identification Time 2
confidence assessment.
Confidence-accuracy characteristics are found using the suspect identification-focused
equation (Wixted, Read, & Lindsay, 2016). This equation is n_1STP/(n_1STP +n_2FTA/N).
n_1STP is the number of suspect identifications made in a target present lineup. n_2FTA/N is the
number of filler identifications made in a target absent lineup divided by the number of people in
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the lineup. CAC determines how accurate the eyewitness is with a certain level of confidence.
The information would then be plotted on a graph. The x-axis represents the level of confidence:
“low”, “medium”, or “high”. The y-axis represents the percentage of correct identifications. On
the CAC graph, there will be five lines, one line for each confidence assessment (Fig. 4). Finally,
using the same equation as above, the point-biserial correlation will be evaluated.

Figure 4 Experiment’s confidence-accuracy characteristics for choosers
For the pre/post-identification Time 2 confidence assessment, “low” confidence
eyewitnesses will have the lowest percentage of correct IDs. However, as Whittington et. al
(2019) demonstrated, the “high” confidence may not yield the highest percentage. For the CAC,
“high” levels of confidence with the Time 3 confidence assessments will have the highest
percentage of correct suspect identifications. Furthermore, regardless of which confidence level
has the highest CAC for pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 and pre/post-identification Time 2
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confidence assessments, this percentage will be lower than the Time 3 assessments.
Pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessment will have the highest CAC with the
“low” confidence assessment. This is because participants will provide overconfident
assessments and make a filler identification in a target absent lineup. Kruger and Dunning (1999)
demonstrated that participants in the lower quartile will overestimate their abilities. If this
translates to these participants will have a 25 percent chance of answering correctly, then both
the “medium” and “high” confidence groups will have a great possibility of having filler
identifications that reduce the percentage that other confidence assessment groups do not have.
For the point-biserial correlations, post-identification only Time 3 confidence assessment
will have the strongest confidence-accuracy correlation. pre/post-identification and
pre-crime/post-identification Time 3 confidence assessment will also have strong correlations
between confidence and accuracy, but the correlations will be weaker than post-identification
only Time 3 (Whittington et. al, 2019). For pre/post-identification Time 2 confidence assessment,
the confidence-accuracy correlation will be weak (Whittington). Finally,
pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessment will have a negative correlation.
This will be due to the same reasoning as the low percentage of correct IDs in the “high”
confidence group for pre-crime/post-identification Time 1 confidence assessment. Participants
overestimate their own abilities, so the low confidence will be similar to other conditions, but as
the confidence increases, the accuracy will decrease because of the participant’s poor
self-evaluation.
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Appendix

Participant ID
#

Condition Group/Confidence
Assessment Time

Lineup

Level of
Confidence

Identification
Results

1

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

98%

Filler ID

1

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

91%

Filler ID

2

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

95%

Filler ID

2

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

88%

Filler ID

3

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

92%

Filler ID

3

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

77%

Filler ID

4

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

95%

Filler ID

4

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

79%

Filler ID

5

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

99%

Filler ID

5

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

62%

Filler ID

6

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

97%

Filler ID

6

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

63%

Filler ID

7

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

88%

Filler ID

7

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

55%

Filler ID

8

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

72%

Filler ID

8

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

52%

Filler ID

9

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

69%

Filler ID

9

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

47%

Filler ID

10

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

67%

Filler ID

10

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

43%

Filler ID

43
11

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

55%

Filler ID

11

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

38%

Filler ID

12

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

55%

Filler ID

12

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

39%

Filler ID

13

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

50%

Filler ID

13

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

31%

Filler ID

14

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

46%

Filler ID

14

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

30%

Filler ID

15

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

37%

Filler ID

15

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

22%

Filler ID

16

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

33%

Filler ID

16

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

21%

Filler ID

17

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

20%

Filler ID

17

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

19%

Filler ID

18

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

0%

Filler ID

18

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

15%

Filler ID

19

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

5%

Filler ID

19

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

0%

Filler ID

20

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

29%

Filler ID

20

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

0%

Filler ID

21

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

21%

Filler ID

21

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

5%

Filler ID

22

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

100%

Correct Rejection
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22

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

100%

Correct Rejection

23

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

90%

Correct Rejection

23

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

97%

Correct Rejection

24

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

82%

Correct Rejection

24

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

98%

Correct Rejection

25

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

83%

Correct Rejection

25

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

95%

Correct Rejection

26

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

70%

Correct Rejection

26

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

88%

Correct Rejection

27

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

27

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

87%

Correct Rejection

28

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

78%

Correct Rejection

28

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

85%

Correct Rejection

29

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

60%

Correct Rejection

29

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

77%

Correct Rejection

30

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

50%

Correct Rejection

30

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

78%

Correct Rejection

31

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

55%

Correct Rejection

31

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

70%

Correct Rejection

32

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

54%

Correct Rejection

32

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

69%

Correct Rejection

33

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

45%

Correct Rejection

33

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

55%

Correct Rejection

45
34

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

34

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

45%

Correct Rejection

35

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

33%

Correct Rejection

35

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

66%

Correct Rejection

36

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

69%

Correct Rejection

36

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

54%

Correct Rejection

37

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

88%

Correct Rejection

37

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

30%

Correct Rejection

38

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

43%

Correct Rejection

38

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

20%

Correct Rejection

39

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

57%

Correct Rejection

39

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

40

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TA

79%

Correct Rejection

40

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

45%

Correct Rejection

41

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

93%

Filler ID

41

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

92%

Filler ID

42

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

87%

Filler ID

42

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

95%

Filler ID

43

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

83%

Filler ID

43

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

82%

Filler ID

44

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

79%

Filler ID

44

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

83%

Filler ID

45

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

75%

Filler ID

46
45

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

87%

Filler ID

46

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

69%

Filler ID

46

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

72%

Filler ID

47

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

54%

Filler ID

47

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

68%

Filler ID

48

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

49%

Filler ID

48

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

65%

Filler ID

49

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

48%

Filler ID

49

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

59%

Filler ID

50

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

45%

Filler ID

50

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

52%

Filler ID

51

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

39%

Filler ID

51

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

49%

Filler ID

52

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

33%

Filler ID

52

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

31%

Filler ID

53

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

25%

Filler ID

53

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

30%

Filler ID

54

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

0%

Filler ID

54

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

0%

Filler ID

55

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

98%

Correct Rejection

55

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

100%

Correct Rejection

56

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

96%

Correct Rejection

56

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

90%

Correct Rejection

47
57

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

93%

Correct Rejection

57

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

81%

Correct Rejection

58

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

88%

Correct Rejection

58

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

85%

Correct Rejection

59

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

82%

Correct Rejection

59

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

95%

Correct Rejection

60

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

82%

Correct Rejection

60

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

87%

Correct Rejection

61

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

77%

Correct Rejection

61

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

82%

Correct Rejection

62

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

62

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

84%

Correct Rejection

63

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

70%

Correct Rejection

63

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

64

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

71%

Correct Rejection

64

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

88%

Correct Rejection

65

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

65%

Correct Rejection

65

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

83%

Correct Rejection

66

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

85%

Correct Rejection

66

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

72%

Correct Rejection

67

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

88%

Correct Rejection

67

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

73%

Correct Rejection

68

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

90%

Correct Rejection
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68

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

63%

Correct Rejection

69

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

55%

Correct Rejection

69

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

62%

Correct Rejection

70

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

40%

Correct Rejection

70

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

55%

Correct Rejection

71

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

33%

Correct Rejection

71

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

42%

Correct Rejection

72

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

84%

Correct Rejection

72

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

33%

Correct Rejection

73

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

90%

Correct Rejection

73

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

55%

Correct Rejection

74

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

40%

Correct Rejection

74

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

58%

Correct Rejection

75

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

67%

Correct Rejection

75

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

43%

Correct Rejection

76

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

60%

Correct Rejection

76

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

78%

Correct Rejection

77

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

99%

Correct Rejection

77

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

63%

Correct Rejection

78

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

30%

Correct Rejection

78

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

32%

Correct Rejection

79

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

69%

Correct Rejection

79

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

25%

Correct Rejection
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80

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TA

79%

Correct Rejection

80

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TA

10%

Correct Rejection

81

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

91%

Filler ID

82

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

90%

Filler ID

83

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

73%

Filler ID

84

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

67%

Filler ID

85

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

68%

Filler ID

86

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

62%

Filler ID

87

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

58%

Filler ID

88

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

53%

Filler ID

89

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

44%

Filler ID

90

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

43%

Filler ID

91

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

37%

Filler ID

92

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

23%

Filler ID

93

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

25%

Filler ID

94

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

15%

Filler ID

95

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

20%

Filler ID

96

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

0%

Filler ID

97

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

0%

Filler ID

98

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

100%

Correct Rejection

99

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

92%

Correct Rejection

100

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

90%

Correct Rejection

101

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

95%

Correct Rejection
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102

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

89%

Correct Rejection

103

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

81%

Correct Rejection

104

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

82%

Correct Rejection

105

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

87%

Correct Rejection

106

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

100%

Correct Rejection

107

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

92%

Correct Rejection

108

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

74%

Correct Rejection

109

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

75%

Correct Rejection

110

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

67%

Correct Rejection

111

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

73%

Correct Rejection

112

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

68%

Correct Rejection

113

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

66%

Correct Rejection

114

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

0%

Correct Rejection

115

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

8%

Correct Rejection

116

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

24%

Correct Rejection

117

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

10%

Correct Rejection

118

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

56%

Correct Rejection

119

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

22%

Correct Rejection

120

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TA

26%

Correct Rejection

121

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

97%

Correct ID

121

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

122

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

99%

Correct ID

122

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

99%

Correct ID
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123

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

95%

Correct ID

123

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

124

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

93%

Correct ID

124

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

97%

Correct ID

125

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

92%

Correct ID

125

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

98%

Correct ID

126

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

100%

Correct ID

126

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

93%

Correct ID

127

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

88%

Correct ID

127

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

128

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

87%

Correct ID

128

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

96%

Correct ID

129

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

79%

Correct ID

129

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

97%

Correct ID

130

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

71%

Correct ID

130

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

131

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

69%

Correct ID

131

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

92%

Correct ID

132

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

64%

Correct ID

132

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

91%

Correct ID

133

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

59%

Correct ID

133

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

134

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

60%

Correct ID
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134

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

93%

Correct ID

135

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

55%

Correct ID

135

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

88%

Correct ID

136

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

52%

Correct ID

136

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

85%

Correct ID

137

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

53%

Correct ID

137

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

83%

Correct ID

138

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

54%

Correct ID

138

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

82%

Correct ID

139

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

42%

Correct ID

139

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

75%

Correct ID

140

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

45%

Correct ID

140

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

77%

Correct ID

141

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

43%

Correct ID

141

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

72%

Correct ID

142

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

46%

Correct ID

142

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

71%

Correct ID

143

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

41%

Correct ID

143

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

65%

Correct ID

144

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

42%

Correct ID

144

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

54%

Correct ID

145

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

35%

Correct ID

145

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

45%

Correct ID
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146

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

32%

Correct ID

146

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

44%

Correct ID

147

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

20%

Correct ID

147

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

47%

Correct ID

148

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

15%

Correct ID

148

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

33%

Correct ID

149

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

30%

Correct ID

149

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

25%

Correct ID

150

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

29%

Correct ID

150

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

0%

Correct ID

151

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

90%

Filler ID

151

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

80%

Filler ID

152

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

85%

Filler ID

152

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

75%

Filler ID

153

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

73%

Filler ID

153

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

60%

Filler ID

154

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

75%

Filler ID

154

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

55%

Filler ID

155

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

60%

Filler ID

155

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

50%

Filler ID

156

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

55%

Filler ID

156

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

30%

Filler ID

157

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

95%

Rejection
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157

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

85%

Rejection

158

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

88%

Rejection

158

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

65%

Rejection

159

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

70%

Rejection

159

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

0%

Rejection

160

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 1

TP

45%

Rejection

160

Pre-Crime/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

50%

Rejection

161

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

94%

Correct ID

161

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

162

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

94%

Correct ID

162

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

163

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

95%

Correct ID

163

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

91%

Correct ID

164

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

96%

Correct ID

164

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

165

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

99%

Correct ID

165

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

97%

Correct ID

166

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

82%

Correct ID

166

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

98%

Correct ID

167

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

87%

Correct ID

167

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

168

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

85%

Correct ID

168

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

93%

Correct ID
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169

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

82%

Correct ID

169

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

170

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

89%

Correct ID

170

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

92%

Correct ID

171

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

75%

Correct ID

171

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

172

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

72%

Correct ID

172

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

99%

Correct ID

173

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

69%

Correct ID

173

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

91%

Correct ID

174

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

67%

Correct ID

174

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

175

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

62%

Correct ID

175

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

89%

Correct ID

176

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

63%

Correct ID

176

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

85%

Correct ID

177

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

60%

Correct ID

177

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

82%

Correct ID

178

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

55%

Correct ID

178

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

83%

Correct ID

179

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

56%

Correct ID

179

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

74%

Correct ID

180

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

53%

Correct ID
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180

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

73%

Correct ID

181

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

54%

Correct ID

181

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

75%

Correct ID

182

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

51%

Correct ID

182

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

71%

Correct ID

183

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

45%

Correct ID

183

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

65%

Correct ID

184

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

49%

Correct ID

184

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

59%

Correct ID

185

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

40%

Correct ID

185

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

34%

Correct ID

186

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

25%

Correct ID

186

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

17%

Correct ID

187

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

20%

Correct ID

187

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

9%

Correct ID

188

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

10%

Correct ID

188

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

189

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

0%

Correct ID

189

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

93%

Correct ID

190

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

88%

Filler ID

190

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

85%

Filler ID

191

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

90%

Filler ID

191

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

75%

Filler ID
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192

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

75%

Filler ID

192

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

70%

Filler ID

193

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

60%

Filler ID

193

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

44%

Filler ID

194

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

33%

Filler ID

194

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

22%

Filler ID

195

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

100%

Rejection

195

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

90%

Rejection

196

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

69%

Rejection

196

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

62%

Rejection

197

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

67%

Rejection

197

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

14%

Rejection

198

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

75%

Rejection

198

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

34%

Rejection

199

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

0%

Rejection

199

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

20%

Rejection

200

Pre/Post-Identification Time 2

TP

24%

Rejection

200

Pre/Post-Identification Time 3

TP

10%

Rejection

201

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

202

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

99%

Correct ID

203

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

204

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

98%

Correct ID

205

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

97%

Correct ID
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206

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

207

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

208

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

98%

Correct ID

209

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

92%

Correct ID

210

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

93%

Correct ID

211

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

212

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

99%

Correct ID

213

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

94%

Correct ID

214

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

96%

Correct ID

215

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

95%

Correct ID

216

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

100%

Correct ID

217

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

82%

Correct ID

218

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

81%

Correct ID

219

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

82%

Correct ID

220

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

79%

Correct ID

221

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

75%

Correct ID

222

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

76%

Correct ID

223

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

69%

Correct ID

224

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

66%

Correct ID

225

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

62%

Correct ID

226

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

58%

Correct ID

227

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

58%

Correct ID

228

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

52%

Correct ID
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229

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

50%

Correct ID

230

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

36%

Correct ID

231

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

25%

Correct ID

232

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

27%

Correct ID

233

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

0%

Correct ID

234

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

82%

Filler ID

235

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

73%

Filler ID

236

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

54%

Filler ID

237

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

90%

Rejection

238

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

69%

Rejection

239

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

67%

Rejection

240

Post-Identification Only Time 3

TP

0%

Rejection

Table 1A Measures collected from the experiment. The table has 5 columns: Participant’s ID, the
condition and time the confidence assessment was taken, the type of lineup, percentage of
confidence, and the type of identification made. Raw data is based on Whittington et. al (2019)
and Kruger and Dunning (1999).
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